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ABSTRACT
This paper challenges the Kripkean interpretation of a posteriori necessities. It will be 
demonstrated, by an analysis of classic examples, that the modal content of supposed a 
posteriori necessities is more complicated than the Kripkean line suggests. We will see 
that  further  research  is  needed  concerning  the  a  priori  principles  underlying  all  a 
posteriori necessities. In the course of this analysis it will emerge that the modal content 
of a posteriori  necessities can be best described in terms of a Finean conception of 
modality – by giving essences priority over modality.  The upshot of this  is  that  we 
might be able to establish the necessity of certain supposed a posteriori necessities by a 
priori means.
1. The traditional account
The traditional, widely accepted story about a posteriori necessities goes like this: an 
empirical  discovery  associated  with  a  supposed  a  posteriori  necessary  statement 
together with a certain general a priori principle imply that the identity statement is an a 
posteriori necessity. This story comes of course from Saul Kripke (1980: 109), although 
presently we are not  concerned about  what  Kripke himself  might  think about  these 
matters. In any case it is clear that there is an interpretation of Kripke which goes as  
suggested above and seems to be fairly widely accepted amongst Kripkeans.1
What we want to ask now is what is the modal content of a posteriori necessities 
based on, in virtue of what are they necessary? At least in most cases, the modal content 
seems to come from the a priori part. To take one of the usual examples, consider the 
identity statement ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’. We can analyse it as follows. We know a 
posteriori  that  Hesperus  is  in  fact  Phosphorus,  that  is,  we  know  that  the  identity 
statement ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true. Further, we know a priori that if Hesperus is 
1 See for instance Hughes (2004) or Soames (2005).
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Phosphorus,  then  it  is  necessary  that  Hesperus  is  Phosphorus.  Clearly,  Hesperus  is 
necessarily Phosphorus in virtue of the a priori part.
Even if this story were correct, more needs to be said in its support. Kripke does not 
seem to be particularly concerned about this, but his commentators have attempted to 
fill the gaps. One issue which is especially pressing concerns the empirical discoveries 
associated with a posteriori necessities, i.e. how do we know that an identity statement 
is  in  fact  true?  Christopher  Hughes suggests  the  following concerning ‘Hesperus  is 
Phosphorus’:
We know that Hesperus is a celestial body and that Phosphorus is a celestial body. Also, 
given what we know about where Hesperus and Phosphorus are at certain times, and about 
how celestial bodies move, we can infer that Hesperus and Phosphorus are in some of–
indeed, in all of–the same places at all the same times. And we know that different celestial 
bodies don't occupy all the same places at all the same times. So we know that Hesperus  
and Phosphorus are the same celestial body, and thus that Hesperus = Phosphorus is true. 
(Hughes 2004: 213; footnote omitted.)
This analysis,  it  seems,  is very much on the right lines.  However,  it  complicates 
matters somewhat, for now it seems that further modal content is introduced to the story 
before the Kripkean proof of the necessity of identity enters the picture. Namely,  we 
know that different celestial bodies do not occupy all the same places at all the same 
times.  This  information  concerns  the  essential  features  of  celestial  bodies,  and it  is 
crucial for the empirical discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Furthermore, it seems 
that the modality involved here is of a different kind than the modality involved in the a 
priori truth that if an identity statement is true it is necessarily true. This is because the 
latter is based on the logical proof familiar from Kripke (1971) and, if true, expresses 
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something general about identity statements. This logical proof, however, amounts to 
little unless further assumptions are introduced. Specifically,  its applicability may be 
restricted to identity statements concerning singular terms (cf. Soames 2005: 23-24), yet 
examples  concerning  theoretical  identity  statements  such  as  ‘Water  =  H2O’  are 
generally considered to be the most important ones. Furthermore, the modality appears 
to be attached to all identity statements simply because they are identity statements, 
even  though  there  are  important  discrepancies  between  the  identity  conditions  of 
different  kinds  of  entities.  Indeed,  it  would  appear  that  the  modality  in  question  is 
logical in  nature,  whereas  the  modality  in  the  empirical  finding  is  metaphysical:  it 
concerns  the  essences  of  the  entities  under  scrutiny,  it  expresses  something 
metaphysically  substantial.  What  is  the difference  between these types  of  modality? 
Well, logical necessity, which I take to be a subspecies of metaphysical modality, does 
not  entail  metaphysical  necessity.2 On  reflection,  I  do  not  think  that  this  is  a  very 
controversial  point:  we have a  number  of alternative  logics  with different  inference 
rules and hence we can have different results concerning what is necessary. Unless we 
have some reason to think that the logic we use corresponds with reality, then there is 
no direct entailment from logical modality to metaphysical modality. Indeed, if ‘Water 
= H2O’ is a necessary truth, then this necessity is grounded in a metaphysical truth, not a 
logical one, as we will see in the course of this paper. In any case, even if there is a way 
for  the  Kripkean to  overcome these problems,  the question  of  the  additional  modal 
content within the empirical discovery remains.
2 At least insofar as we are dealing with so called strict or narrow logical necessity,  i.e. necessity in 
virtue of the laws of logic and necessity in virtue of the laws of logic plus the definitions of concepts,  
respectively.  So called broad logical  necessity,  which takes into account the natures of entities, is 
effectively metaphysical necessity.
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2. The a priori content that precedes empirical discoveries
What is the source of the additional modal content in the empirical discovery? If we 
look  at  the  passage  quoted  from Hughes  above,  it  appears  that  he  is  listing  some 
essential  features  of  celestial  bodies,  planets.  Moreover,  the  modal  content  of  the 
empirical discovery seems to be grounded in these essential features, as it is exactly in 
virtue of the impossibility of celestial bodies occupying all the same places at all the 
same times that we know Hesperus and Phosphorus to be identical. In other words, we 
need a priori knowledge about the  general  essence of the kind ‘planet’ to be able to 
derive that Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus.3
 Perhaps we ought to look deeper into this a priori part, as the apriority of the fact 
that two material bodies cannot occupy the same space-time point could be contested. It 
could be argued that this is an empirical discovery, perhaps based on Coulomb's law4 
and the fact that material  particles are subject to this law. But a closer examination 
reveals once again that there is a priori content sneaked in with the empirical discovery. 
Coulomb’s law is a generalisation and it is indeed based on empirical observations, but 
if it is to carry any modal content, namely to imply that material bodies of the same kind 
are  necessarily  identical  if  they occupy the same space-time point,  something more 
must be said. Although Coulomb’s law seems to have an extremely wide applicability, 
empirical experiments can never verify its universal applicability. Accordingly, we need 
to combine Coulomb’s law with a theory of electrostatic interaction. Furthermore, there 
3 Furthermore,  it  is  of  course  assumed  here  that  Venus  is  a  planet  and  that  ‘Hesperus’  and
‘Phosphorus’ are directly referential. Additionally, it may be that the essential features are knowable 
(only)  a  priori,  as  Lowe (2007) argues.  We will  consider  this in due course.  This has  also been  
discussed in Tahko (2008).
4 Coulomb’s law concerns the relations between electric charges, namely, like chargers repel and unlike 
chargers attract.
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are  even  more  fundamental  laws  in  effect  here,  specifically  the  Pauli  Exclusion 
Principle5, which is ultimately responsible for the space-occupying effect of all material 
particles.  There are, however,  particles  which are not subject to the Pauli  Exclusion 
Principle, namely bosons.
All that has been said above is interesting, but does it have a genuine bearing on the 
identity conditions of massive material bodies, such as planets? I think not: naturally we 
are interested in the microphysical story in the background because the macrophysical 
story that we are primarily interested in presumably supervenes on the microphysical, 
but  we do not need to tell  the microphysical  story in  every instance.  Regardless of 
whether there are particles that violate Coulomb’s law or the Pauli Exclusion Principle, 
we know that material bodies of the kind ‘planet’ are most certainly subject to these 
laws and it is no doubt essential to material bodies of this kind that they occupy space. 
We do not have a priori access to the laws of physics, so we can only know a posteriori 
that planets are subject to certain laws. However, I think that we do know a priori that 
entities of the kind ‘planet’ occupy space, indeed, that this is essential to them. The 
purpose of this discussion is simply to demonstrate that the empirical issues concerning 
these matters are quite complicated, but perhaps we should be more interested in what is 
essential  to  the  kind  ‘planet’. Accordingly,  the  a  priori  content  that  precedes  the 
empirical finding that Hesperus is Phosphorus does not reduce all the way to quantum 
mechanics, although there is further a priori content also in the microphysical story.
5 The Pauli  Exclusion  Principle  states  that  no  two identical  fermions  can  have  the  same  quantum 
number at the same time.
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3. Further complications: the status of essences and a priori principles
Our analysis of a posteriori necessity hints towards an interpretation of metaphysical 
modality  in  terms  of  essences.  As  Kit  Fine  puts  it,  ‘we  should  view metaphysical  
necessity as a special  case of essence’ (1994: 8), rather  than the other way around. 
Grounding metaphysical modality in essences does not only enable us to explain the 
modal content in empirical discoveries associated with a posteriori necessities, but also 
highlights  the  complexity  of  identity  statements  that  are  usually  considered  to  be  a 
posteriori and necessary. However, it appears that establishing the necessity of a given 
identity statement might not be quite as easy as the Kripkean line suggests. Theoretical 
identity statements,  such as ‘Water = H2O’, are especially interesting in this  regard. 
Consider how Scott Soames explains their necessity6:
The  [Soames-type  Kripkean]  account  holds  that  ‘water’  is  a  non-descriptive,  directly-
referential  term designating  a  substance  – where  substances  are  taken  to  be  physically 
constitutive  kinds (instances  of  which share  the same basic physical  constitution).  It  is 
further assumed that a kind of this sort may have different instances in different world-
states, and that if a and b are kinds with the same instances in all possible world-states, then 
a is  b. These are clearly metaphysical assumptions, to which we add the natural corollary 
that for any substance,  s,  if,  in some possible world-state,  instances of  s  have a certain 
molecular structure, then instances of  s  have that structure in every world-state. In other 
words, we assume that it is an essential property of a substance that instances of it have the 
molecular structure they do. From this it follows that [‘Water = H2O’] is necessary if true, 
and that ‘H2O’ – which I take to be equivalent to ‘the substance instances of which have a 
molecular structure with two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom’ – is a rigid designator. 
Being  true,  [‘Water  =  H2O’]  is,  therefore,  necessary.  Since  knowing the  proposition it 
6 There is an on-going debate between Soames and E. J. Lowe about the necessary a posteriori, the 
quoted passage is from Soames’ reply to Lowe – we will attempt to get into the bottom of this debate.
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expresses  requires  knowing  of  a  certain  substance  that  its  instances  have  a  particular 
chemical  structure,  [‘Water  =  H2O’]  is  knowable  only a  posteriori.  (Soames  2007:  36; 
footnotes omitted.)
Apparently, the modal content of the supposed a posteriori necessity ‘Water = H2O’ 
is  based  on the  assumption  that  substances,  such  as  water,  essentially  have  the 
molecular structure that they do and therefore water has the molecular structure H2O in 
all possible worlds. What has been said in support of this assumption?7 Nothing, as far 
as I can tell.  To say generally of substances that they essentially have the molecular 
structure  that  they do is  a  very  strong claim indeed.  Yet  Soames  gives  no explicit  
support  for  the  assumption.  Take  the  case  of  water  and H2O. What  can  be  said  in 
support of the assumption that water  essentially has the molecular structure it in fact 
does? Clearly, no amount of research into the chemistry of water will settle the matter, 
because  we  can  only  study  the  actual molecular  structure  of  water.  The  claim  is, 
however, that the organisation of hydrogen and oxygen atoms in water is necessary. It 
could  be  suggested  that  the  general  principle,  that  substances  have  their  molecular 
structures essentially, is only a derivative of actual cases, but in this case the principle 
would  hardly  be  a priori.  Alternatively,  perhaps  the  principle  is  not  true  of  all 
substances,  but  rather  confined to  certain  sorts  of  natural  kinds.  Be that  as  it  may, 
something needs to be said in support of this.
We may attempt to trace the modal content here more rigorously. Let us consider the 
general  case,  which  is  what  Soames  seems  to  support.  What  would  the  empirical 
implications be like? Well, we know that the manner in which chemical compounds are 
formed  is  directly  dependent  on  the  atomic  structure  of  the  atoms  involved,  which 
naturally  involves  their  electron  configuration.  Further,  we  know  that  the  electron 
7 Earlier concerns about these issues have been raised by Salmon (2005) and Bealer (1987).
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configuration depends on the energy levels of specific electrons and is moderated by the 
Pauli  Exclusion  Principle.  Very  quickly,  this  regress  goes  all  the  way  down  to 
fundamental  forces,  which  are  ultimately  responsible  for  the  binding  of  atoms. 
Accordingly, the claim that substances have their molecular structure essentially implies 
that the laws of physics governing the binding of atoms are metaphysically necessary. It 
is unsettling that something as widely acknowledged as the necessity of ‘Water = H2O’ 
commits us to such strong claims.
Perhaps  it  is  a  physical  necessity  that  substances  have  the  particular  molecular 
structure that they actually have, but it would be precarious to claim, without argument, 
that  the  fundamental  forces  could  not  have  been  arranged  otherwise  to  produce  a 
substance exactly like water in every detail, apart from the molecular structure. It is not 
clear how we are supposed to decide whether this substance would be water or not, and 
the claim at hand does not concern only water, but all substances. Certainly, something 
must  be  said  about  the  general essence  of  substances  to  make  sense  of  this  claim, 
namely  whether  or  not  it  is  an  essential  feature  of  substances  that  they  have  the 
particular molecular structure that they actually have. This is a subject that is of course 
beyond  empirical  research,  but  more  importantly:  empirical  research  concerning 
substances would not be possible in the first place if we did not have at least some a 
priori knowledge about the general essence of substances.8
We may have a strong intuition about the essentiality of composition for substances, 
but the typical Kripkean story about these matters takes this as given, when clearly the 
source  of this intuition should be our primary interest. In what follows I will suggest 
that this intuition, if it is valid, must be based on a priori work. There have been some 
8 The relationship between a priori inquiry and empirical research has been discussed extensively in 
Tahko (2008).
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attempts (e.g. Salmon 2005) to engage in this a priori work before, but it seems to me 
that they have been half-hearted at best. Some guidelines for how we should proceed in 
this regard will be suggested in the last section of this paper.
It may seem that what has been said does not pose a challenge to the Kripkean (or 
Putnamian), as the Twin-Earth story presumably allows for substances, such as ‘XYZ’, 
that are superficially similar to water, but differ in molecular structure. It is just that a 
substance like this is not water, or so the story goes. But what is the argument for this 
assumption? As we saw, Soames certainly gives us no argument for it. It seems to be 
simply built in the account that we have the intuition that XYZ would not be water. A 
potential  line  of  thought  which  might  support  this  assumption  is  the  one  that  was 
sketched above, but that line of thought seems to be unable to account for the necessity 
of  ‘Water  =  H2O’,  because  the  assumption  that  substances  essentially  have  the 
molecular structure that they actually have is not supported. But even if there were an 
appropriate a priori argument available we would have reasons to doubt the route by 
which the necessity of ‘Water = H2O’ was established, as Lowe (2007) has convincingly 
argued.9
Similar problems emerge with other classic examples, such as ‘Gold is the element 
with the atomic number 79’. Do elements essentially have the atomic number that they 
actually  have?  Perhaps  alternative  physics  which  produces  the  periodic  table  with 
atomic numbers different from the actual ones, yet elements indistinguishable from the 
actual ones is metaphysically possible – perhaps not. In any case, this is not something 
that  can  be  settled  by  considering  Twin-Earth  scenarios.  Rather,  what  we  need  is 
research concerning the essences of substances and elements.
9 These reasons are derived from the Finean understanding of essence, namely that it should not be  
treated as a special case of metaphysical necessity. I take this point and develop it in what follows.
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4. A sideline: how the account at hand differs from the deflationary line
The upshot of the previous section is that we should take the essences of whichever 
entities we are concerned with more seriously than the classic Kripkean line does, but 
the shortcomings of the Kripkean line have also inspired completely opposite reactions. 
It should be made clear that the account being proposed here is not at all similar to the 
deflationary  line  suggested  by  Alan  Sidelle  and  others.  Sidelle  analyses  identity 
statements such as ‘Water = H2O’ as follows10:
[E]ach necessary a posteriori truth should be seen as derived from a combination of an 
analytic  principle  of  individuation  that  has  empty  spaces  to  be  filled  in  by  empirical  
findings  and  a  particular  empirical  finding  that  of  itself  carries  no  modal  weight.  For  
example,  in  the case  of  water’s  being necessarily H2O, the analytic  principle might  be 
‘Nothing counts as water in any situation unless it has the same deep explanatory features 
(if  any)  as the stuff we call  “water”’,  and the empirical  fact,  which makes the result  a 
posteriori,  is  that  the  deep  explanatory  feature  of  the  stuff  we  call  ‘water’  is  being 
composed of H2O. (Sidelle 2002: 319.)
Sidelle goes on to suggest that there is nothing metaphysical in the modal content of 
a posteriori necessities; instead we are dealing with analytic, linguistic principles. Given 
what has been said above, it is not hard to contest Sidelle’s line. The supposed a priori 
content in a posteriori necessities can indeed be interpreted roughly like Sidelle, as well 
as Jackson (1998) and Chalmers (1996), suggest. However, we have already seen that 
the empirical inquiry is not empty of modal content,  i.e.  that empirical inquiry  does 
carry modal weight, as it involves a priori knowledge concerning at least the  general 
10 Sidelle refers, quite correctly, to Frank Jackson (1998) and David Chalmers (1996) in this connection  
– they take a somewhat similar line regarding a posteriori necessities.
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essences of whatever kinds of entities we happen to be dealing with.11 For Sidelle and 
others,  the focus seems to be on the  analytic a priori  principle  which is supposedly 
responsible  for  the  modal  content  of  a  posteriori  necessities.  Consequently,  when 
Sidelle (as well as Jackson and Chalmers) talk about the a priori part in a posteriori 
necessities, they are talking about something that is analytic or linguistic in nature. The 
a priori part that we have been referring to is within the empirical, a posteriori part of 
the story, it  precedes the empirical discovery.12 However, it is not my purpose here to 
refute or examine the deflationary views, it will be sufficient to note that they are in the 
opposite end of the scale.
5. A priori instead of a posteriori metaphysically necessary truths?
The quarrel  that  I  have with the Kripkean line is  thus altogether  different  from the 
Sidelle-Chalmers-Jackson line, it concerns the nature of essences and their role in the 
supposed a posteriori necessities. Lowe sums this up as follows:
If Soames is right, the key contribution of Kripke to  the metaphysics of essence was to 
show how, by combining a priori knowledge of  general  essential truths with a posteriori 
11 Hence, I think that scientists (and everyone else) have a priori knowledge of general essences. Our 
epistemic access to essences is, I believe, based on our knowledge of metaphysical possibilities, which 
we can analyse with the help of a priori reasoning. However, it is not possible to provide a sufficient  
account of the epistemology of essences here, I merely wish to point out that we must have some kind 
of a priori access  to essences to be able to explain metaphysical  necessities. Accordingly,  we are  
certainly not dealing with linguistic or conceptual knowledge here, but rather the most fundamental 
kind of metaphysical knowledge.
12 It should be mentioned in this connection that the decoupling of a priori and a posteriori content here  
is somewhat misleading, as has been demonstrated in Tahko (2008).
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knowledge of  particular  actual facts, we could generate instances of  particular  essential 
truths that are knowable only a posteriori. (Lowe 2007: 291.)
Lowe goes on to suggest that it is more likely that essential truths are knowable only 
a priori if they are knowable at all.  In fact, it appears that the cart has been put before 
the horse here: it looks as if particular facts, e.g. that water is in fact H2O, are the reason 
for the intuitions  concerning  general  essential  truths,  e.g.  that  substances  have their 
actual molecular structures essentially – or, at any rate, the a priori inquiry that led to 
this  general essential  truth  has  not  been  made  explicit.  Accordingly,  the  move  to 
particular essential truths, e.g. that water has its molecular structure essentially, seems 
unwarranted even within the Kripkean scheme. However, our main concern is that the 
Kripkean scheme is misleading to start with. An alternative account, on the lines of Fine 
and  Lowe  (although  Fine  seems  to  be  neutral  regarding  our  epistemic  access  to 
essences), would be to give the priority to essences, in which case a priori inquiry into 
the essences of the entities under investigation is enough – a posteriori knowledge of 
particular actual facts need not enter the picture. It would indeed appear that, at least in 
some cases, supposed a posteriori  necessities are not a posteriori  at all,  but rather a 
priori. Lowe (ibid.) also questions whether particular substances, such as water, even 
have individual essences. It is thus safer to illustrate the scheme with the help of another 
example, preferably one that does not concern individual essences. I will now proceed 
to analyse the details of the a priori work that we need to engage in to establish the 
necessity of some common examples of supposed a posteriori necessities.
Consider  the classic  example ‘Cats  are Animals’.  Nathan Salmon has provided a 
Kripkean analysis of this and related examples:
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We know a priori that if a biological kind (e.g., a species)  k is subsumed under a higher-
level biological kind (e.g., a genus, class, kingdom, etc.)  k', then it is necessary that  k is 
subsumed under  k'.  We also know by the direct  reference  theory of  the designation  of 
natural  kind  terms  that  such  terms  as  'cat',  'tiger',  'mammal',  and  'animal'  are  rigid 
designators  of  natural  kinds.  Putting  these  two  together,  we  know  a  priori,  by 
“philosophical analysis,” that if all cats are animals, then it is necessary that all cats are 
animals, and if all tigers are mammals, then it is necessary that all tigers are mammals, etc. 
Science  discovers  empirically  that  cats  are  in  fact  animals,  and  that  tigers  are  in  fact 
mammals.  Combining  these  scientific  discoveries  with  what  we  know  a  priori by 
philosophical analysis, we infer that it is necessary, even though a posteriori, that cats are 
animals and that tigers are mammals. Given what we know by philosophical analysis – the 
theory of direct  reference plus the  a priori essentialist fact that every biological kind k is 
such that it could not fail to be subsumed under any of the higher level biological kinds k' 
that in fact subsume it – any empirical discovery that cats are in fact animals, or that tigers  
are  in  fact  mammals,  is  indirectly  but  automatically  an  empirical  discovery  that  it  is 
necessary that cats are animals, or that tigers are mammals. (Salmon 2005: 195.)
Leaving aside for the moment the problems involved with natural kind terms – and 
whether ‘animal’ even constitutes a natural kind – it seems clear that the a priori content 
concerning the supposed a posteriori necessity ‘Cats are Animals’ includes knowledge 
about  the  necessary  connection  between  a  higher-level  category  and  a  lower-level 
category, i.e. a category and its subcategory. However, it is less clear what the status of 
the empirical discovery that cats are in fact animals is. An alternative analysis of the 
example reveals that we might be able to establish the necessity of ‘Cats are Animals’ 
entirely by a priori means. If we have a priori access to categorial information, which 
information concerning the category of ‘Animals’ presumably is, then we can grasp the 
general essence  of  the  category  of  ‘Animals’.  Similarly,  we can  grasp  the  general 
essence of the kind ‘Cat’, and it is surely part of the general essence of the kind ‘Cat’ 
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that it is a subcategory of ‘Animals’.13 In other words, simply by the a priori information 
concerning the necessary connection between a category and its subcategory, and by the 
a priori information concerning the  general  essences of ‘Cats’ and ‘Animals’, namely 
that the first  is a subcategory of the latter,  we can derive the necessity of ‘Cats are 
Animals’.  The  empirical  discovery  that  cats  are  in  fact  animals  does  not  enter  the 
picture,  contrary  to  how  the  Kripkeans  would  have  it.  This  seems  quite  plausible, 
because even describing what the empirical discovery that cats are in fact animals  is 
appears to be problematic. To establish that cats are animals, we must already know 
what  animals  are,  that  is,  we must  have  grasped the  general essence  of  ‘Animals’. 
Furthermore, before we can engage in any empirical research concerning cats, we must 
also have grasped the general essence of ‘Cats’. Thus, we could discover, by empirical 
means, that the creatures we thought were cats are in fact demons, but this only means 
that in the actual world there are no cats, but only ‘fool’s cats’.14 It would still be the 
case that ‘Cats are Animals’ is a necessary a priori truth – in all possible worlds where 
cats exist, they are animals.
One  concern  that  might  emerge  at  this  point  is  that  ‘Animal’  is  vague:  are  for 
instance viruses animals?15 Perhaps it is even a part of the essence of ‘Animal’ that it is 
vague. As I noted above, I do not wish to engage in a thorough analysis of ‘animal’ 
here,  perhaps it  does not even constitute  a natural kind.  However,  although there is 
13 Why think that we would have a priori access to categorial information? Well, for one thing, it seems  
that we can have information about merely possible kinds of entities, and this information could not  
be a posteriori (because there are no entities of that kind in the actual world). Much more would need 
to be said about this of course, but I only hope to hint towards an alternative analysis of what is going  
on in supposed cases of a posteriori necessity. This type of approach has also been hinted towards by 
Lowe (e.g. 2007).
14 Kripke was right about this.
15 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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clearly  vagueness over natural kind terms, I think that we are dealing with linguistic 
rather  than metaphysical  vagueness.  In general,  we might  be wrong about  what  the 
identity  and  existence  conditions  of  certain  natural  kinds  are,  or  mistaken  about  a 
natural  kind  altogether,  but  this  does  not  imply  that  there  has  to  be  metaphysical 
vagueness over the matter. Accordingly, we can and often do make mistakes; even if 
have a priori access to the essences of natural kinds, it does not mean that we always get 
the story right, the point of this paper is to underline this.
A further analysis of the epistemic side of the story might be helpful, although I have 
discussed it in more detail elsewhere (cf. Tahko 2008). Firstly, the notion of ‘a priori’ is 
not being used in its traditional sense here, although for current purposes it might be 
enough  to  note  that  we  are  dealing  with  synthetic  rather  than  analytic  a  priori 
knowledge. It is also crucial for this account that information about essences precedes 
empirical information. The link between our a priori capabilities and knowledge about 
essences is metaphysical modality: a priori reasoning concerns metaphysical modality 
(cf. ibid.) and metaphysical modality is grounded in essences, as the Fine-Lowe line 
suggests. So, ‘Cats are Animals’ could be considered an a priori metaphysical necessity 
in virtue of:
1. A priori knowledge concerning the necessary connection between a category 
and its subcategory, namely that a category has its subcategories by necessity.
2. A priori knowledge concerning the general essence of ‘Animals’, namely that 
‘Animals’ is a categorial term capable of having certain types of subcategories, 
i.e. instances of ‘Animals’.
3. A priori knowledge concerning the general essence of ‘Cats’, namely that it is 
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metaphysically  possible that  there  are  creatures  such as  cats  which  satisfy the 
criteria for a subcategory of ‘Animals’, i.e. they are instances of animals.
Perhaps the most interesting part is the third one. We only need a priori knowledge 
about  the metaphysical  possibility  of  a  kind  such as  ‘Cats’  to  be  able  to  grasp the 
general essence of ‘Cats’. Once we have the general essences of ‘Cats’ and ‘Animals’, 
we only need to add the further piece of a priori knowledge concerning categories and 
subcategories to be able to determine that ‘Cats are Animals’ is an a priori metaphysical  
necessity.  We do not need to refer to  actual  cats or animals at all, the metaphysical 
necessity holds regardless of the status of cats and animals in the actual world, even if  
there are no such entities.
So, it appears that we can provide an analysis of the necessity of ‘Cats are Animals’ 
which does not rely on empirical information, but how about ‘Tigers are Mammals’? It 
might seem that it is less plausible that the empirical discovery that tigers are in fact 
mammals does not enter the picture, although the case appears to be analogous to ‘Cats 
are  Animals’  –  it  certainly  is  for  Salmon.  However,  it  is  questionable  whether 
‘Mammal’ behaves in the same manner as ‘Animal’.  My Oxford English Dictionary 
defines  ‘Mammal’  as  a  warm-blooded  vertebrate  animal,  which  has  hair  or  fur, 
produces milk  and typically  gives  birth  to  live  young.  These features,  it  seems,  are 
contingent: could tigers not evolve in such a manner that they seize to fulfil the criteria 
of ‘Mammal’? Accordingly, perhaps we are not dealing with a natural kind here at all, 
and perhaps ‘Tigers  are  Mammals’  is  indeed a  posteriori,  but  also  contingent.  This 
highlights the fact that we must be particularly sensitive to the subject-matter of the 
identity-statements that we are dealing with, they must receive individual treatment. As 
I noted above, we could easily be altogether mistaken about some natural kinds, this 
may even the case with ‘Animals’, which makes the study of the essences of whichever 
entities we are dealing with all the more important.
We can now also reconsider the case of ‘Water = H2O’. We would need at least the a 
priori  information  that  substances  have  their  molecular  structure  by  necessity,  i.e. 
information  concerning  the  general essence  of  chemical  substances,  to  be  able  to 
determine that water molecules are necessarily composed of two hydrogen atoms and 
one oxygen atom – this much is uncontroversial. However, as we saw, it is far from 
obvious what the general essence of chemical substances includes. It may be that there 
is nothing more to the story in addition to the a priori principles concerning chemical 
substances: unless water has a further, individual essence, we can establish the necessity 
of water being H2O simply with the help of the general essence of chemical substances. 
Of course, it is also an open question whether water does have an individual essence. In 
any case, if the appropriate a priori arguments can be established, then similar analysis  
would be available in the case of ‘Water = H2O’ as we saw above in the case of ‘Cats 
are Animals’. It appears though that such arguments are extremely difficult to establish. 
However,  I  admit  that  I  share  the  intuition  that  chemical  substances  have  their 
molecular structure essentially, and I would like to briefly examine the origins of this 
intuition.
In section 3 we observed that if this intuition is valid, then it must be a physical  
necessity that chemical substances have the very molecular structure that they in fact 
have. How could we support this claim? Well, the forming of molecules is dependent on 
the bonding ability of atoms, a crucial feature of which is the electron configuration of 
atoms. As we have already noted, this is moderated by the Pauli Exclusion Principle. 
Now, the question is whether we could have a different set of atoms, call it XYZ, which 
could produce the chemical substance water. Note again that the Twin Earth scenario 
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does not have a bearing on this: we are looking for a justification for the intuition which 
the whole scenario is based on (at least when it is interpreted as expressing something 
metaphysically substantial, as serious essentialists would have it). It seems thus that our 
intuitions  underlying  the  Twin  Earth  scenario  and  related  examples  have  not  been 
sufficiently  analysed  in  this  regard.  As  has  already  been  argued,  the  intuition  that 
chemical substances have their molecular structures essentially implies that certain laws 
of physics are necessary. But this is a very controversial assumption – it appears that 
some worlds with different laws of physics are ruled out as impossible automatically. 
Now, if they are indeed impossible, surely this requires a more detailed discussion.
Perhaps it should also be noted that even though water appears, on the face of it, to 
be  a  non-functional,  compositional  stuff16,  what  we  are  really  interested  in  are  its 
chemical properties rather than its composition. That is, if we had a substance which 
has  exactly  the  same  chemical  properties  as  water  but  a  different  molecular 
composition, would we really be entitled to say that it is not water? As I have stressed 
above, I do not think that this has been established. However, if it is indeed a physical 
necessity that chemical substances have their molecular structures essentially, then we 
simply could not have a substance which has the same chemical properties as water, but 
a different molecular composition. Accordingly, the intuition that XYZ would not be 
water, if it is a valid intuition, is based on the fact that there could not be XYZ! It is an 
interesting question whether the intuition really is valid. It certainly seems that in the 
actual  world  there  could  not  be  a  combination  of  atoms  XYZ  such  that  it  would 
replicate  the  chemical  properties  of  water,  although  we  would  have  to  turn  to  our 
colleagues  in  physics  and chemistry  for  the  details.  But  it  is  up to  philosophers  to 
determine  whether  the  situation  could  be  different  in  other  possible  worlds  –  our 
colleagues in the empirical sciences can do very little to assist us in this regard. Indeed, 
16 As opposed to, say, food (cf. Bealer 1987: 296).
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this  is  why the necessity of the identity statement  ‘Water  = H2O’, if  the identity  is 
necessary, has to be established by a priori means.
I do not have an a priori  proof at hand which would establish the essentiality of 
composition for chemical substances. I suspect that such a proof is available though and 
my guess is that it will have something to do with the laws that govern the forming of  
macrophysical objects. The manner in which subatomic particles form atoms and atoms 
bind together to form molecules is not arbitrary and it seems plausible to think that, had 
fundamental  forces  been  arranged  otherwise,  macrophysical  objects  would  not  be 
possible at all. This is because even the slightest change in these forces would cause 
instability – perhaps the Pauli Exclusion Principle would not hold and electrons would 
end up in the same quantum state, rendering bonds between atoms impossible. Perhaps 
the nuclei of atoms would not hold together because the  strong force that overpowers 
the repulsive forces between quarks would not be quite strong enough. Granted, all this 
is very speculative, but it seems to be the only way to go if we hope to establish the  
essentiality of composition for chemical substances.  It seems to me that the likeliest 
candidate  responsible  for  the  essentiality  of  composition  is  the  Pauli  Exclusion 
Principle. Although I have no means to prove it here, I think that this principle is a very 
likely candidate for a metaphysically necessary law of physics.
It  should be clear by now what my preferred analysis  of modal  truths is. I  most 
certainly do not wish to ground modal truths in conceptual truths. As we saw, this is the  
line that Sidelle, Jackson and Chalmers would perhaps take. I wish to ground modal 
truths in essential truths, following Kit Fine, i.e. it is the essence of water that makes it 
necessary that ‘Water = H2O’, if  anything.  Or,  more accurately,  it  is the essence of 
chemical substances, if anything, that makes it necessary that ‘Water = H2O’, as the key 
assumption is that chemical substances have their molecular structures essentially. This 
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line may or may not be different from the Kripkean line, that makes little difference to 
me. What I wish to emphasize is that the truthmakers of modal claims are essences, not 
concepts.
Obviously,  matters are a lot more complicated than it is often suggested. It is not 
easy to determine when an identity statement holds by necessity. The origin of these 
problems seems to be a misconception concerning the ‘logic of essence’, as Lowe puts 
it (2007: 291): in the Kripkean picture essences are apparently derived from semantic 
intuitions rather than from metaphysical considerations, and thus provide illegitimate 
grounds  for  modal  truths.  The  ease  with  which  the  purported  necessity  of  certain 
identity statements has been established is suspicious at the very least, and it appears 
that one reason for this unwarranted lapse in critical analysis is the ambiguity over the 
semantic  and metaphysical  agendas  in  Kripke's  Naming and Necessity.  However,  it 
could  of  course  turn  out  that,  despite  these  shortcomings,  most  or  all  of  the  usual 
examples of a posteriori necessities are indeed necessary, but perhaps we have been too 
hasty to conclude that they are also a posteriori. The best course of action to settle the  
matter is to analyse these cases rigorously in the manner suggested above.
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